Suicides in Army: A comprehensive review needed

Suicides and fragging by army jawans have become a more frequent occurrence in the army of late. The Samba incident last week once again compels me to ask: What is it that drives a jawan to desperation? Is it just the tension of operating in the counter-insurgency? Or is there something more to it than meets the eye?

There are no straight answers but figures available since 2003 clearly indicate that that the Indian army is facing one of its biggest challenges in history. Consider the figures

In 2003, 96 army men committed suicide

In 2004, this number was exactly 100

In 2005, 92 of them took their own lives

In 2006, 131 army personnel committed suicide

In 2007 and 2008 the recorded figures were 142 and 150 respectively.

Since then the numbers have come down but still remain over 100.

2009: 111; 2010: 130; 2011: 102.

Given that India has an 11-lakh strong army, these numbers may not be huge but for a force that prides itself on its standards of training and discipline, it is certainly a matter of concern if not alarm.

One can also point out the fact that in the American Army this year alone the rate of suicide (till June 8) was one-a-day.  That’s hardly a consolation.

Therefore, like I had done in 2007, its time to ask the question: Is the Indian Army feeling the heat of being in perpetual operations? Are our soldiers’ stress levels peaking dangerously? Making them prone to acts of indiscriminate violence?

Come summer, winter or rains, soldiers continue their daily patrols along the line of control in Kashmir. Every day and night at a thousand foot patrols spread out in in Jammu and Kashmir to try and corner terrorists. The job is risky and can even get monotonous. A bullet can come from anywhere any time. So one has to be always alert. but the chase is mostly futile. Nine out of ten times the patrols returns empty-handed.

After nearly 14 years of counter-terrorism in Kashmir, the Army has got used to the apparent hardship of uninterrupted operations. The fear of the enemy, claims each man that I have talked to, is nominal. “We have no tension in this respect( counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency), we had joined the army precisely for this kind of work,” is the constant refrain from soldiers.
Officers say their biggest duty  is to ensure that men are fully trained to face any situation in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism. “A fully-trained soldier is a confident soldier and effective soldier,” Commanding officers say whenever one meets them.
But this practicised auto-reply could cloak a very different reality.

A psychiatric study by army doctors a couple of years ago on “Evolving Medical Strategies for Low Intensity Conflicts ” revealed the huge range of issues soldiers in such situations have to confront contradictions between war and the low intensity conflict situations and particularly the concepts of ‘enemy’, ‘objective’ and ‘minimum force’.There are no clear-cut victories like in wars. Some other findings:


  • In general war the nation looks upon the soldier as a saviour, but here he is at the receiving end of public hostility.
  • A hostile vernacular Press keeps badgering the security forces, projecting them as perpetrators of oppression.
  • Continuous operations affect rest, sleep and body clocks, leading to mental and physical exhaustion.
  • Monotony, the lure of the number-game and low manning strength of units lead to over-use and fast burn-out.


Leading psychiatrists also feel that there is disconnect between what a soldier is trained for and what he ends up doing in low-intensity conflicts
I remember that some years ago Dr. Nimesh Desai, a practicing psychiatrist had told me: “There is a certain dissonence in what the soldier feels when he operates in low intensity conflict. He is trained for war, to go all out against an enemy but in insurgency, he is told to hold back. Plus there is no end in sight for such operations. It is the constant tension that gets him.


Operating in tension-ridden counter-insurgency environment does lead to certain stress among the jawans but that is only one of the factors. The main worry are the problems back home–land disputes.. tensions within the family, rising aspirations, lack of good pay and allowances, and also the falling standards of supervision from some officers, all these factors have led to major stress.

Company commanders who lead field units in counter insurgency situations also believe that tensions at home transmit themselves much quicker today.

Since almost 80 per cent of India’s foot soldiers come from rural and semi-urban areas, most of them have strong links with land.
For the ordinary soldier, the smallest patch of land back home is the most precious property.

Again, I have frequently come across  a common thread where soldiers say there is no tension in actual work of counter-insurgency. The main problem for the fauji comes from his domestic situation. Very often land gets encroached in the village back home or there is dispute over even smallest of property. “There is  always a tension. Police doesn’t listen to us. My parents feel helpless, I become tense every time I go back home,” I remember a soldier telling me in the Valley.

One more common thread among soldiers from Rajasthan to UP, from Tamil Nadu to Haryana was how little respect they seem to command today in society which devalues their work.

As a former Army Commander had once pointed out: “You see he comes from a society where he compares himself with others and when he realises that he is at a disadvantage since acceptance wise, the kind of respect that his predecessors had is no longer there.”

Very often insensitive civil administrations create tensions. 


Senior officers point out that most suicide and fratricide cases take place after soldiers return from a spot of leave. T


he feeling of frustration can bring in helplessness which in turn leads to suicides and fratricide it creates an impression that no one listens to the army. It is the system that sends the man uniform in depression. 




It is precisely this concern that had prompted defence minister AK Antony to  write to all chief ministers some years ago asking them to sensitise district administrations in their states to the needs of the soldiers. State governments were asked to set up a mechanism at district and state levels to address soldiers’ grievances. 
The harsh reality is that men in uniform no longer command the respect they did in the early years after independence. Today, they have fight for getting equivalence with officers of Group A Central Government services!
And yet, the Army must look within too.
Soldiers these days are better educated and consequently better aware of their rights. This, coupled with falling standards of command and control among some of the undeserving officers who have risen to command units, is becoming a major cause for worry.
Soldiers no longer accept a wrong or unjustified command blindly. The old attitudes among some of the COs, of lording over ORs and expecting them not to protest/revolt must change.
While there is no single reason that can be cited as THE cause for suicides and the recent standoffs that have happened in a couple of units in the quick succession in the past three months, the Army leadership will have to take a hard look at the disturbing developments and come up with quick but effective solutions.

Further viewing and reading:

(I had made this film exactly a year ago. It shows the risks, the monotony and sheer thanklessness of the soldiers’ job in Kashmir)


  1. August 11, 2012 -

    I do not agree. Career offrs have always been there.ACR consciousness existed before also.So what has changed. Status n respect in society. Degradation of pay, pension.Deaf adminis.Apathy towards men on leave to resolve their probs.Insensitive bureaucracy. These have weakened his tenacity and need immediate resolution.

  2. August 11, 2012 -

    Received immediate reaction on email from a friend who knows Army intimately. Here it is: Dear NitinApropos your article.The major reason for suicides in army is the detachment of offrs and JCOs from the affairs of the men in a steep hierarchy. Firstly there is acute shortage of offrs at the bottom of the pyramid. Next the lowering of age of COs has resulted in fewer offrs available in the unit. The steep chart to promotion to Colonels has resulted in stiff competition at the junior levels where people are more interested in ensuring safety of their careers based on getting good ACRs. The combined result makes them risk averse sycophants who put career interests above organisational goals thus marginalising the leadership module – something the army prided itself in.The AVSC report has done great injustice by lowering age of COs thereby putting immature and career oriented offrs at the helm. This is accentuated by acute shortages in unit. Together the two have vitiated the leadership environment in the units – the cutting edge. There are many more mutinies waiting to happen as the leadership paradigms are heavily stacked in favour of careerism rather than genuine leadership. This will adversely affect the warfighting potential of the army – when needed.

  3. August 11, 2012 -

    Nitin,Well written as have tried to explore various aspects of this phenomenon.Do we have enough data on the suicides to segregate / classify them on the basis of various parameters and perform root cause analysis? Am saying this because we have a pretty large number of incidents – avg 100 per year since 2003 – to find trends.Parameters can be -1. Geographical posting and duty assigned at the time of Suicide / Fragging2. Unit to which the soldier was assigned to alongwith name of CO- To find any linkage with the leadership abilities of the COs3. Rank of the soldier – Can we get financial health on that basis?4. Home state of the soldier / State in which the immediate family members of the soldier reside – Can be linked to specific situation in the state.5. Time between suicide and last visit to family – further any linkages to phone calls made just before suicide. – that can be the trigger while the overall frustration must have been building up since long.I hv tried to jot down whatever came to my mind..but would really like to know whether this can lead to better analysis of such unfortunate incidents.Trushant

  4. August 11, 2012 -

    bulls eye

  5. August 12, 2012 -

    Dear Trushant,Agreed that I do not have enough data but the Defence Institute of Psychological Research has done a lot of work on this since 2007. And most of their findings suggest that domestic stress followed by humiliation some times heaped upon soldiers by officers are the main triggers for suicides. But you are right. This needs a lot of better analysis is needed on this vital issue.

  6. August 13, 2012 -

    Another point out of view by my elder cousin retired Brigadier Sunil Gokhale who spent more than 35 years in the Army. His father too retired as a brigadier.Here is his response:Suicides in the Armed ForcesThe above mentioned problem has got considerable media attention, recently a newspaper gave out an agregate figure of suicides exceeding over one thousand in the last decade. An incident of a Jawan's suicide in one of the oldest and most decorated armoured regiment is also in the news. Suicides are a universal phenonmenon, . Suicides are caused by psychological stress, officers undergo a psychological test at the point of selection at the SSB, even then some officers have commited suicide (your mother's cousin brother late Maj Mukund Kanhere a paratrooper also commited suicide sometime around 1964 in Agra). As for jawans, they do not undergo psychological tests like officer candidates, thus the possibility of persons who may not be able to sustain psychological rigours of military life getting recruited is a certainity. Such persons may be more prone to be driven to this extyreme step.Suicides are generally attributable to failure of command and leadership, I feel this is not entirely correct, I have seen a jawan who came from a farmer family commit suicide after he came to know he had inherited a burden of agrarian debt exceeding Rs 6 lakh from his father who died of over consumption of alcohol. The jawan got himself insured from an unscrupolous insurance agent in his home town, reported back to unit and pulled the plug on his life, probably thinking his mother could claim insurance and clear the debt, this cannot be attributed to command failure. What I am trying to say is that suicides should be not hastily reported by the media for the sake of sensational news. Also the lack of psychological screening of jawans need to be addressed by the armed forces.

  7. December 4, 2012 -

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